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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ln the Matter of the Estate 
of 
EMMA G. BUTTARS, 
Deceased. 
Case No. 7945 
PETITION FOR 
REHEARING on 
behalf of Contest-
ants and Appellants. 
Appeal from the District Court of Cache County, Utah 
' 'll ·. 
·' -'> \. ' :• ' __ ,.
il -
. ' " 
r · .- '.;' ( f 't , 
'· \ Respectfully subtnitted, 
George C. Heinrich 
Attorney for Contestants and Appelants. 
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of the jury. 
00POINT No. 2: The court in its opinion not only invaded the pro-
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate 
of 
·EMMA G. BUTTARS, 
Deceased. 
Case No. 7945 
PETITION FOR 
REHEARING on 
behalf of Contest-
ants and Appellants. 
Comes now the contestants and appellants herein and 
hereby petition the above Honorable Court for a rehearing 
for the following reasons and grounds upon which it is 
most respectfully submitted the court erred, to-wit:-
ARGUMENT 
Point No. 1: After stating in the opinion rendered 
under date of Sept., 26, 1953, that this is a law 
case, the court nevertheless in the last two para-
graphs of its opinion sets out testimony of respon-
dent and weighs it against testimony of appellant, 
thus clearing invading the function of the jury. 
It is indisputable that in re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah, 
207, 167 Pac. 256, In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 52 
Pac. 2d 1103, and in re Swan's Estate, 51 Utah 410, 170 
Pac. 452, all hold that whether or not a testator was of 
sound and disposing mind is a law case and so a question 
of fact for the jury upon competent evidence, and that 
3 
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4 
these cases prescribe and define what sort of evidence is 
admissable. In fact, in the Swan case, supra, at page 457 
left-hand column, this court says: 
"As before stated, if there is any substantial evidence 
to support the findings, our duty becomes fixed and 
absolute, no matter how much or what kind of evi-
dence there may be on 'the other side." 
It is submitted that the two last concluding para-
graphs of the opinion written in the face of evidence in the 
record flatly contradictory and which the court apparently 
entirely ignored. The statement that the "uncontradicted 
testimony of friends, neighbors and trademen was that 
their contacts with testatrix even after her illnesses she 
always appeared nea~ and understood what she was talk-
ing about" etc. is not a fact. Evidence in direct conflict 
to this statement was given by Melvin, a son, who at aU 
times knew his mother inti:mately, and by her daughters, 
~.fargaret and Maybell, both of whom lived close-by, visi-
ted with their mother often, assisted in her care, who were 
literally at all times in and out of her home and all of whom 
observed their mother's every change both mentally and 
physically over the years.. In fact, Melvin, in great detail 
recited and described the failing condition of his mother's 
health from her first _ illness through her second illness 
both of which occured before she signed her so-called 
will, then gave it as his opinion that his mother's mental 
condition was one of incompetence, even on the date the 
will was signed, and both of his sisters, Margaret and May-
bell, in substance gave the same conclusion. A mere cur-
sory examination of the testimony of such "friends and 
neighbors" who testified, being Dave Sparks, Bishop Rave-
ston, S. Goodey, and Mrs. Thompson, will show that their 
testimony was very unsatisfactory and very little left of 
it after cross-examination. A jury could hardly be expec-
ted to follow such testimony as against the other positive 
testin1ony just mentioned given on behalf of the children 
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5 
of deceased. The opinion then further stated "and that 
the ·doctor who attended her testified that in his opinion 
she was competent during all time except in ~larch, 1952."' 
It is submitted that the doctor's testimony is the flimsiest 
of all and his testimony is respectfully referred to. Such 
a statement on the part of the doctor cannot be correct be-
cause he only saw the de9eased occasionally. He knew 
absolutely nothing about her condition when the will was 
executed. Then, too, his testimony was flatly contradic-
ted by Melvin, Margaret and Maybell, and the jury could 
if they preferred accept their testimony rather than that 
of the doctor according to the specific holding. in the 
Swan case, supra. At any rate, this is another conflict in 
the testimony which this court ignored in its opinion, 
thus overriding the verdict of the jury on substantial evi-
dence in conflict which the jury had a right to resolve. 
Two "trademen" testified on behalf of proponents, Mrs. 
Allen of Logan and a Mr. Bowles a linament salesman. 
The linament salesman saw the deceased periodically and 
so could know very little about her; and his testimony is 
also contradicted. ~1rs. Allen, also saw deceased very in-
frequently, and in fact her testimony reveals that she did 
not even know deceased very well. The deceased at most 
was a very casual and infrequent customer. In this 
that she did not even know deceased very well. In this 
connection it is a singular fact that the last time deceased 
was in Mrs. Allen's. store she was accompanied by her 
daughters Maybell and Archulius and went to the store 
to purchase. a dress to attend to her deceased son, Ira's, 
funeral, and then she had forgotten entirely that her son 
had died. If testimony was desired on the part of trades-
Inen, then it may appropriately be asked, why did not 
proponents obtain the testimony of the general storekeeper 
at Clarkston, where the record shows most of the grocer-
ies, ·etc. were purchased? The obvious answer is as stated 
by contestants, deceased's condition was such that they did 
not want it generally known and that she stayed in the 
hon1e. At an~' rate, the a hove shows that there ,,,·as a 
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very decided conflict in the testimony, all of which this 
court also entirely overlooked so far as can be ascertained 
fron1 its opinion because there is no mention made of it 
anywhere. Hereafter, petitioner will refer to the testi-
mony of the subscribing witnesses to the will mentioned 
in the last paragraph of its opinion. 
POINT NO. 2: The court in its opinion not only in-
vaded the province of the jury in weighing the evi-
dence, but it also entirely overlooked from its con-
sideration a great quantity of evidence produced upon 
the trial for the consideration of the jury, none of 
which is referred to in its opinion. 
In its opinion, this Honorable Court gives the follow-
ing quote fro;m In re Hanson's Estate, 87 Utah 580, 
52 Pac. 2d, 1103: 
"A person may not be capable of conducting ordinary 
business because not. trained in it or even if incapable 
mentally may in cases be capable of making a simple 
will. The true test is as to whether the testatrix had 
sufficient mind and memory at the time of making the 
will to remember who were the natural objects of her 
bounty, recall to mind her property, and dispose of it 
understandingly according to some plan formed in 
her mind." 
Following this the court cites In re Swan's estate, 
supra. It is significant that the Swan case states that 
when a will is made by a person who has reached the age 
of upwards of eighty years and it is shown that the usual 
infirmities of old age such as hardening of the arteries 
and consequet loss of memory, etc., have supervened, the 
question of whether the testator possessed the legal capac-
ity to make a will at the time of its execution is never free 
from difficulty and is nearly always shrouded more or less 
in doubt. The opinion just handed down by this court 
recognizes that the deceased was of the age of eighty 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
years when she executed her so-called will and that when 
she was _seventy-five years of age she became very ill and 
hospitalized and was suffering from kidney troubles, high 
blood pressure and hardening of the arteries, and that her 
memory became poorer and that gradual dterioration con-
tinued to the very day of her death. Such, it is submitted 
is the very situation prevailing in the Swan case, supra, and 
the theory upon which the case at bar was tried and upon 
which facts the jury decided the issues in favor of contest-
ant. 
Now applying the evidence to the last quote: The 
Swan case holds that it is the duty of the subscribing wit-
nesses not only to witness the signature of testatrix, but 
they must also pass on her testamenty capacity. At the 
outset it must be remembered that this so-called will was 
made within 30 days after the death of her eldest son, 
David, and whose death Emma G. Buttars could not fully 
realize. 
The two witnesses in the case at bar were the attorney who 
drew the will and his stenographer. Neither ever saw 
Emma G. Buttars be~ore. She was only in the office not 
more than 30 minutes at the very most. She had been 
brought there by her son Wallace, who ~1elvin testified 
simply "led his mother around." The only time the sten-
ographer was in Mrs. Buttars presence was when the at-
torney dictated the will and then when she returned the 
typewritten copy. Preparation of the will was a hurried-
up affair. The attorney did not remember much of any-
thing about her according to his own testimony. He did 
not even remember whether or not she had with her a 
memorandum to recall who the natural objects of her 
bounty were. The record of both of these witnesses is res-
pectfully referred to. Admittedly neither of then1 kne\v 
n1uch about her. The jury could well ha\'e concluded 
that these \Vitnesses did not pass upon her testatnentarv 
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capacity, or if they did, that their testimony taken in con-
nection with the other testimony as to the mental condition 
of deceased, they disagreed with the judgment of the wit-
nesses to the will, a~. they had a right to do under the 
Swan case, supra. At ap.y rate here was another conflict 
which the jury had a right to and did resolve against the 
validity of the will. Nor is this a case where any one ever 
considered Emma G. Buttars as an eccentric person. Her 
whole life and the whole record before this court is exactly 
to the contrary. The whole picture presented by the 
record is that before her illnesses she was a resolute de-
termined person, lool<ed after her affairs, with a will of 
her own and a strong believer that everybody should earn 
what they received, and that each of her children should 
be treated equally, even Wallace and Hattie testified to 
this. In fact, from the time of the death of her husband 
and during all the times she was in good health she never 
distributed or gave anything to any of her children. But 
after she became ill, it affected her, her condition worse-
ned and worsened to the very day of her death. She was 
never the same herself again according to all of her chil-
dren who testified for contestants. Gradual deterioration 
had set in and continued on so that at the time of the 
execution of her will, and after, she was never in full pos-
session and control of her faculties. It is again submitted 
earnestly that the case is in all respects similar and paral-
lel with the facts in the Swan case, supra. and that it is 
not the case of a person eccentrix in her actions and for-
getful at ti1nes of some things as stated in the last para-
graph of the court's opinion, nor is such a contention any-
where mentioned in the entire record. And the jury upon 
a very sharp and substantial conflict in the testimony de-
cided otherwise. 
As to "recall to mind her property." Even attorney 
Daines said she did not dicuss her property with him. 
There is therefore no evidence at all on the part of propon-
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ents that she fulfilled this requirement for making a will, 
that she was able to "recall to mind her property." On 
the other hand, contestants' testimony is positive. ~I elvin 
testified that she did not know what she had, worried a-
bout income or enough to live on when she in fact had 
plenty, and that she did not know her property from that 
of others. The further testimony as to her condition with 
reference to this point is that all of her children, Oriso~1 
(now deceased) Wallace, Hattie, Melvin, Maybell, ~lar­
garet and Gover, called a meeting because her mental 
and physical condition was such that she could not be left 
alone. They did not even want her condition known. So 
they did not want a guardian appointed. She did not go 
out of the house, and she did not even know that her 
daught~rs were being paid for caring for her out of her 
own money. She sold one tract of land to Archulius for 
$500.00, one fourth its real value. Gave Thatcher Bros. 
Bank stock (now First Security Stock) to Archulius be-
cause, as stated in a memo, that the stock Archulius had 
received from her father's estate proved eventually to be 
worthless, and then for the same reason gave Archulius a 
48 acre tra·ct of land, and then Archulius said, and it is not 
denied by her, that she might just as well have had the 
160 acre tract instead of just the 48 acre tract. Is not 
such testimony more reliable and trustworthy than that of 
"friends, neighbors, trademen" or even that of "the doc-
tor" and surely does it not show lack of capacity to 1nake 
a will? Small wonder attorney Daines testified that she 
did not discuss her property with him. The plain truth 
of the matter is that she could not comprehend her pro-
perty at the time of execution of her will, and the jury 
after a three day trial so concluded she could not, and the 
jury's verdict is supported by an abundance of evidence. 
The jury's verdict should be upheld by this court. 
And the next requirement of the above quote is: "and 
dispose of it (the property) understandingly according 
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to some plan formed in her mind". Let us now take a 
look as to how this requirement has been fulfilled accord-
ing to the evidence in the record. Undeniably, the record 
shows deceased had and accumulated considerable pro-
perty at the time she made her so-called will; that from 
the date of the death of her husband to the time of making 
her will, March 22, 1945, she disposed of none of it, and 
that she always said, even in her will, that her children 
shall all be treated alike. It certainly cannot be disputed 
that the record is replete with evidence that at the time 
of making her will she could not "recall to mind her pro-
perty;,, some of which evidence is alluded in the preceed-
ing paragraph .. 
In the second paragraph of her will, she gives her 
grandchildren, the children of one of ·her very fondest son 
who was deceased, and of all of whom she could be very 
proud because they had each and every one of them, the 
grandsons, either served honorably in the Armed Forces, 
fuHilled a mission, or in some instances both, each the 
sum of $1.00, because she had loaned to her deceased 
son the sum of $1500.00 twenty-seven years prior when 
there is evidence to the effect that the loan had been re-
paid, and so marked by deceased herself (Cont. Ex. 1) 
that never once did any one, not even Wallace, ever hear 
his mother ever say that her deceased son Daniel was 
owing anything and in the face of undisputable evidence 
that Daniel was doing well at all times financially. The 
mortgage security itself had never even been recorded 
It must certainly be plain that deceased would not have 
left her son Daniel, or his heirs, out for any other reason 
except the notion that he was still indebted when he was 
not. From such testimony in the record which the jury 
listened to closely for three full days, can it be said that 
the deceased /:'understandingly'' made the bequest con-
tained in this second paragraph? The jury no boubt de-
cided this otherwise. 
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And in the next paragraph ( 3) she directed that the 
rest, residue and remainder of her estate be given in equal 
shares to the remainder of her children; and in the fifth 
paragraph she named Wallace as executor, so to serve 
without giving bond. · This statement that she wanted 
~o treat all of her children 4:4:equally" or "alike" is in keep-
ing with what she said all her life, but it is submitted that 
when the statement was made in the will it amounted 
to nothing more nor less than a bare statement, because 
by this time, after two serious illnesses, her mental and 
physical condition in the language contained Inre Swan's 
Estate, was such that it must have caused the jury to in-
quire into deceased's "lost memory" ond to inquire, 'now 
far the faculty of understanding has lost its original 
strenght and vigor as regards those facts of personal history 
of testator, which enter into and form a part of the plan-
ning and execution of a rational, fair, and just testament". 
·How ccunderstandingly" Emma G. Buttars formed this plan 
is answerved by the fact that commencing six days after 
the execution of a so~called plan (her will) she conveyed 
one 60 acre tract of land to Wallace, for which purpose 
he brought her to Logan, that on April 9, 1945, she gave 
bonds and stocks of considerable value to Hattie and 
Archulius because, as she says, (and this was after doing 
nothing about it from 1917 to 1945) stocks distributed to 
them out of their father's estate eventually turned out to 
be of no value, and then for the same reason gave Arch-
ulius a 48 acre tract of land. See the brief of appellants 
for a list of the transfers and convevances, as a result of 
.I 
which :within beginning within six days after deceased was 
supposed to have decided to have formed a plan to "dis-
pose of it (her property) understandinglt! according to 
some plan formed in her mind"", for no explainable reason 
on earth other than the result of her own failure of health 
by reason of her advanced age and the iinpact of her ill-
nesses, she favored Wallace and Archulius "'ith substantial 
preferences, Wallace getting n1ore than Archulins and 
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Archulius getting more than Hattie, and all three of these 
being favored over the other children. So that within a 
few days after "understandingly'' willing her estate ac-
cording to a plan formed, equal to her children, the so-
called plan became unequal and unjust to a shameful 
degree, and it is submitted in a way that Emma G. Buttars 
never for a moment would have permitted had she been 
her real former self. Nothing was left of her will except 
to dispose of what was left and to permit Wallace to act 
as executor in doing this. The writer of this brief earnest-
ly contends that this action on the part of deceased viewed 
in the light of the testimony of the condition of the deceas-
ed at the time she executed her so-called will, cannot be 
dismissed in the language of this court contained in the 
paragraph, "and that after she made her will she disposed 
of a good portion of her property after a liftime of careful 
saving is no proof that at the time of making her will she 
lacked testamentary capacity", and that in view of all of 
the evidence, conflicting and otherwise, which the jury 
had the right to resolve, that "The court therefore did not 
err in admitting the will to probate in view of the complete 
lack of evidence that at the time of making the will testa-
trix lacked the mind to understand what she was doing". 
Such a statement completly ignores evidence produced 
on the part of contestants. Finally, it is seriously urged 
that a grave injustice will result if this will is permitted 
to stand, one that testatrix would not herself permit it 
if she could help herself. If such a will is permitted to 
stand, then older people and their heirs are helpless to 
protect them. 
WHEREFORE, contestants submit that the decision 
rendered by this court is upon its face in error in that it 
weighs the testimony of proponents against that of the 
contestants, contrary to the authorities cited therein, that 
it omits from its consideration entirely substantial conflict-
ing evidence given by contestants, and that the decision 
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is otherwise in error for the reasons given in thie petition 
and the brief of contestants referred to herein which ren- .li.: .. ·
ders its judgment approving and sustaing the lower court 
and setting aside the verdict of the jury highly inequitable 
and unjust, and so earnestly and seriously request a rehear-
ing and reconsideration of the entire cause based on both 
the facts and the law applicable thereto; that such request 
in indeed in all respects similar to a like request made and 
granted in re Swan's Estate, supra, and which resulted up- .1 
on further consideration of this court in an opinion uphold-
ing the trier of the facts based upon evidence almost iden-
tical to that produced in the case at bar. 
Respectfully submitted, 
George C. Heinrich 
Attorney for Contestants and Appelants. 
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